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 1. Liberal Culturalism 
 Will Kymlicka’s new anthology Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multicul-
turalism, and Citizenship (2001) – a collection of previously published essays – is an 
excellent compendium of the thought of one of the most influential political philoso-
phers of our times. While covering a number of disparate topics from the evolution of 
minority rights (section 1) over theories of ethno-cultural justice (section 2) and a de-
fense of liberal nationalism (section 3) to the implications of the renaissance of nation-
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alism and the emergence of multiculturalism for democratic citizenship (section 4), 
throughout the book one thread reappears over and over again: Kymlicka’s concern with 
and approval of what he calls liberal culturalism, i.e. liberal nationalism cum multicul-
turalism. 
 Liberal nationalism for Kymlicka is the promotion of  “the legitimate function of the 
state to protect and promote the national cultures and languages of the nations within its 
borders” (Kymlicka, 2001: 38). It is distinguished from “illiberal nationalism” by means 
of the following characteristics: 
- it uses no coercion to impose a national identity; 
- it does not prohibit a mobilization against nationalism; 
- it embraces a fairly inclusive definition of a nation and, consequently, a thinner 
conception of national identity; 
- it is non-aggressive, i.e. it does not try to dismantle institutions of other nationalities 
(Kymlicka, 2001: 39-41). 
 Nationalism in Kymlicka’s view is an integral part of a developed liberal democ-
racy, because social justice, deliberative democracy, and individual freedom are most 
efficiently achieved within national political units (Kymlicka, 2001: 225-229). Nation-
alism serves social justice, as the welfare state requires sacrifices, which presuppose a 
sense of solidarity, which in turn is achieved through a national identity. Deliberative 
democracy requires a common language for all citizens, a condition that is met in pure 
nation states. Individual autonomy can only be attained, if one commands over the nec-
essary cultural tools that enable an individual to make choices. National cultures deliver 
these cultural tools. Nationalism is hence the twin brother of liberal democracy. Still, 
liberal nationalism will necessarily create (unjust) inequalities, since the promotion of a 
national culture will disadvantage members of ethnic minorities, which almost inevita-
bly will exist within most, if not all states. Here is where multiculturalism comes in. It 
requires states to recognize the equally valid claims of ethno-cultural minorities. A just 
state consequently grants these minorities adequate institutional support and some de-
gree of self-government on condition that their internal setup meets the above restric-
tions on nationalism. 
 Kymlicka’s liberal culturalism unifies two brands of collectivist thinking, national-
ism and multiculturalism, hitherto not always regarded as compatible. By merging the 
two most popular strands of political theory as well as political ideology, does he create 
a new yardstick with which the future theorizing on democracy should be measured? 
 
 2. Three Problems with Liberal Culturalism 
 Let me be upfront with what I think of liberal culturalism: It is neither liberal, nor 
culturalist. It is not liberal, because it sacrifices the liberal commitment to individual 
rights on the altar of the valorization of national cultures, which become entitled to 
group rights (Barry, 2001: 112-118; 127-131). It is neither culturalist but at best pan-
nationalist, as it is solely concerned with national cultures. 
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 Apart from the misleading label, Kymlicka’s theory contains a number of serious 
weaknesses. Let me consider three of them, namely Kymlicka’s tendency to discount 
alternatives to liberal culturalism, the flaws in his functionalist justification of liberal 
culturalism, and his nonchalant treatment of empirical evidence. 
 
 2.1. All Multiculturalists Now? 
 Kymlicka is not shy about the appeal of liberal culturalism. According to him, there 
are currently no sensible alternatives to what he and all his alleged allies propose; 
“[l]iberal culturalism has won by default” (Kymlicka, 2001: 43). This assessment not 
only exaggerates the coherence of the culturalist camp, it also seriously underestimates 
the potential of non-culturalist theories. 
 
 2.1.1. Heterogeneity of Liberal Culturalism 
 While it is true that liberal culturalism is currently the dominant paradigm in democ-
ratic theory, this dominance is in no small part an artifact of the multivocality of what 
has been subsumed under culturalism. Thus, while culturalism might be in the pool po-
sition, many individual culturalists will find themselves in less prominent rows when 
fighting for their particular causes. 
 Consider the positions of two most prominent culturalists, Kymlicka himself and Iris 
Marion Young. Kymlicka considers Young (among others) as one of his allies. But 
while Young has groups based on gender, sexual orientation, and a number of other 
characteristics in mind when she talks about multiculturalism, Kymlicka almost1 exclu-
sively thinks of ethno-national groups when he talks about minority rights (Barry, 2001: 
308). Indeed, Kymlicka does not even address the representation of all ethno-national 
groups equally, but reduces the applicability of his theory to those ethnic groups that are 
either recent immigrants or are intergenerational communities, who are “more or less 
institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct lan-
guage and history” (Kymlicka, 1995: 18). Under these circumstances, African Ameri-
cans, gypsies, or Russians in the Soviet successor states are adequately covered, as 
Kymlicka (2001: 56) himself admits. Surely, most other culturalists would like to cover 
these groups, while many others would – tentatively – also include non-ethnic groups as 
potential bearers of group rights. Thus, while culturalists may very well formally be on 
the same side when it comes to group rights, the actual beneficiaries of multiculturalist 
policies differ dramatically across advocates of group rights. The dominance of the 
culturalist paradigm is thus in no small part due to the high abstraction level of the term 
culturalism and does not necessarily indicate a high degree of consensus on the sub-
stantive policy implications of culturalism. The most important reason for the superfi-
 
1 Kymlicka (2001: 298) in passing refers to gender when he discusses genuinely liberal anti-
discrimination laws, which do not entail group rights. Apparently, gender is not on his agenda, but he does 
once acknowledge that “even non ethnic cultural groups such as gays and the disabled” (2001: 41, emphasis 
mine) also ask for state recognition. 
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cial agreement among culturalists is the extremely amorphous conceptualization of what 
exactly constitutes a minority. 
 Yet, we have to concede to Kymlicka that culturalism does have a wide appeal these 
days. That, however, has probably less to do with the intellectual weakness of the alter-
natives to culturalism, and more with the high cultural resonance of culturalism. 
 
 2.1.2. No Alternatives to Liberal Culturalism Left? 
 Of course, it is easy to claim victory, when one ignores one’s most formidable oppo-
nents. And that seems to be one of Kymlicka’s “strategies.” It might be understandable, 
if nevertheless regrettable, that Kymlicka does not address Dinesh D’Souza’s (1992) 
widely read reactionary pamphlet that alleges that contemporary multicultural policies 
are deeply illiberal. After all, it is doubtful whether D’Souza’s work should be included 
into academic discourse at all. At the other end of the political (and academic) spec-
trum, it might also be entirely possible that Kymlicka is unfamiliar with Michael Bil-
lig’s (1995) devastating critique of contemporary Western nationalism, which unfortu-
nately has not (yet?) become the required reading in the courses on nationalism. Kym-
licka’s disregard of the academic “giants” whose writings are at odds with his theory is 
puzzling to say the least. On the more than 400 pages of his book, not once does he 
mention Brian Barry’s (2001) insightful critique of liberal culturalism, which specifi-
cally aims at Kymlicka’s theory.2 Also, he does not consider any of Todd Gitlin’s 
proliferate writings on the politics of difference. He does – once, on page 284 – refer to 
Rogers Brubaker, but he neither examines Brubaker’s (1994) constructionist notion of 
nationality, which differs starkly from Kymlicka’s own quasi-primordial3 conceptuali-
zation, nor does he discuss the very different policy prescriptions of Brubaker’s, which 
follow from such a conceptualization (Brubaker/Laitin, 1998). 
 When Kymlicka does not ignore non-nationalist thinking, he tends to redefine it as 
nationalist. For example, when Kymlicka asserts that nationalism is capable to tran-
scend mortality and therefore facilitates the development of autonomous individuals, he 
refers to Benedict Anderson. For the sake of argument, let us concur with the dubious 
claim that transcendence of mortality promotes autonomy. Transcendence could still be 
accomplished by means of any number of ideologies – among them religious belief 
systems or an enlightenment belief in progress – that would hardly qualify as being 
genuinely nationalist. In view of the fact that Anderson’s writings exhibit a strong anti-
nationalist component, the attempt to construe him as being in favor of nationalist 
propositions is misleading to say the least. 
 With Kymlicka’s tendency to either ignore the opposing views or embrace them as 
belonging to his camp, it almost follows that he dismisses the remaining alternatives to 
 
2 The fact that the essays included in this book were published before Barry’s book, does not explain 
Kymlicka’s silence on Barry, since all the chapters were clearly revised for the anthology. 
3 By “quasi-primordial” I mean a nominally constructivist notion of nationality, which for all practical 
and theoretical purposes assumes primordial properties. 
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liberal nationalism on the grounds that the attacked nationalist propositions would be 
self-evident. For instance, he correctly observes that 
“few citizens in liberal democracies favour a system of open borders, where people 
could freely cross borders, settle, work, and vote in whatever country they desire. Such 
a system would dramatically increase the domain within which people would be treated 
as free and equal citizens. Yet open borders would also make it more likely that peo-
ple’s own national community would be overrun by settlers from other cultures, and 
that they would be unable to ensure their survival as a distinct national culture” (Kym-
licka, 2001: 215). 
 He – again, quite correctly – continues that most liberal theorists have implicitly also 
disbanded the possibility of open borders. However, Kymlicka’s conclusion that there-
fore the nationalist regime of border controls is justified betrays Kymlicka’s training as 
a philosopher. Since when is the validity of philosophical propositions decided by ma-
joritarian vote?4 And since when does the frequent implicitness of a proposition confer 
credence to its adequacy? On the contrary, most propositions that have unconsciously 
been incorporated into political theory stem from a lack of self-reflexivity and thus 
mark (involuntary) ethnocentrism. 
 Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism has not become the default position, because its 
alternatives are intellectually weak or nonexistent, as Kymlicka interprets the situation. 
Instead, it is far more plausible to put Kymlicka’s argument on its head. Because liberal 
nationalism is the default position, alternatives appear as being weak. Like any “domi-
nant perception of the political context” (Diani, 1996: 1057), nationalism has become a 
masterframe, which enjoys high cultural resonances regardless of its empirical validity 
or its moral appropriateness (Gamson, 1992: chapter 8; McAdam, 1994: 41-43). After 
all, with the rise of the modern nation state, national identity has become a masterframe 
institutionalized on state and inter-state level as well as within the scientific commu-
nity.5 Claims for or legitimized with nationalism have therefore gained wide currency, 
even though their premise that a nation is a primordial community is empirically 
flawed. To draw on the vitality of nations and nationalism may (or may not) be a legiti-
mate device in politics, but in political philosophy such moral positivism was aban-
doned a long time ago. 
 
 2.1.3. Is Cosmopolitanism Outdated? 
 
4 And if it is, the last time I checked, this kind of moral positivism did not even pass the 5%-threshold. 
5 That nation states promote the nationality principle is shown in Anderson’s (1983) elaboration on 
“official” nationalism as well as by Billig’s (1995) insightful analysis of “cold” nationalism. For impact of 
inter-state nationalism, see Barkin/Cronin (1994: 126, 128), Brubaker/Laitin (1998: 425), Calhoun (1995: 
253), Hobsbawm (1990: 97f), and Soysal (1996: 11f, 16f). With respect to the scientific community, see 
Billig’s (1995) analysis of Richard Rorty’s nationalism and Luhmann’s (1992) and Elias’ ([1976] 1991: 
XXXVII) observation of the frequent fusion of the concept of the society and the nation state. Finally, see 
Brubaker (1999) and Soysal (1994: 5) for the dominant mélange of national and citizenship identity in 
scientific discourse. 
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 If liberal culturalism does not lack serious theoretical competition, then how does 
one of its major competitors, cosmopolitanism, of which Kymlicka is highly contemp-
tuous, fare? Kymlicka is not only convinced that cosmopolitanism as thinking belongs 
to the past, he also suggests that contemporary cosmopolitans are uprooted individuals, 
whose unease with the ethnic identities of the “common people” prevent them from be-
coming successful analysts of nationalism (Kymlicka, 2001: 248). For Kymlicka, Mi-
chael Ignatieff is a case in point. A multilingual Canadian living in England, Ignatieff’s 
experiences have made it difficult for him to come to terms with nationalism. Like 
many “cosmopolitans today [he] feels threatened and confused” (ibid., p. 249) when 
confronted with nationalism. But that certainly is not a reason why Ignatieff’s analysis 
of nationalism is deficient. After all, as one of the most insightful analysts of national-
ism has noted, “no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed po-
litical nationalist” (Hobsbawm, 1991: 12). And, a liberal nationalist is exactly what 
Kymlicka professes to be. On that count, it could therefore be at least as convincingly 
argued that Kymlicka’s own ideological stance is much less suited to an analysis of na-
tionalism. Of course, Kymlicka also emphasizes that he is not one of the big, bad, un-
democratic and illiberal nationalists and without doubt he is well meaning. But just how 
far are Kymlicka’s theories from “bad” nationalism? 
 It speaks volumes that Kymlicka quotes Max Boehm when rejecting cosmopolitan-
ism. In the 1920s, Boehm belonged to the so-called “young conservatives” (Mohler, 
1950: 83) within the intellectual movement Konservative Revolution (Conservative 
Revolution), which inter alia hoped for the abolition of Weimar Germany’s liberal con-
stitution (ibid., p. 91f) in favour of a morally partial state. This state would promote 
eternal Prussian virtues without simply reinstating the Wilhelminian Kaiserreich. 
Boehm and his collaborators shared with Nazis – under whose regime Boehm continued 
to publish his works on minority rights and nationalism (1943: 87-111) and the fascists, 
whom Boehm (1932: 179) admired for their drive to unify the leadership of the state 
and the people – a disdain for liberalism, individualism, and enlightenment. Cosmopol-
itanism that, according to the avid nationalist Boehm (1932: 183, 307) led the 19th 
century Germans and Italians, who cut across state borders, to self-alienation. For the 
same reason as Kymlicka, Boehm (1932: 15) assumes that cosmopolitans lack the tools 
to understand nationhood. 
 To become an honorable person it is necessary to consciously embrace one’s ethnic 
belonging. Persons who too easily abandon their völkisch grounding are “unprincipled 
and unscrupulous” (Boehm, 1951: 33). Not surprisingly, Boehm shares his faith in eth-
nicity with the contemporary Nouvelle Droite and Neue Rechte, who explicitly rely on 
the thinking of revolutionary conservatism. 
 “A human cannot be separated from his [ethnic] culture, not from his (spatial) envi-
ronment and not from his (temporal) heritage, which have been engraved onto him by 
his culture.” (Benoist, 1981: 89f). 
 A rootedness in one’s nationality is thus “for the development of the European hu-
man of utmost importance” (Binding 1981: 46). That is altogether not too far from 
Kymlicka, who approvingly quotes Ronald Dworkin writing that societal culture “pro-
vides the spectacles through which we identify experiences as valuable” (Dworkin, 
1985: 228). 
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 “For this reason, the foundational liberal commitment to individual freedom can be 
extended to generate a commitment to the ongoing viability and flourishing of societal 
cultures. [… The thence derived] rights and powers ensure that national minorities are 
able to sustain and develop their cultures into the indefinite future” (Kymlicka, 2001: 
210). 
 That Kymlicka calls Conservative Revolutionary into his witness stand is thus not 
merely accidental, but simply illustrates the elective affinity between the proto-fascism 
of Revolutionary Conservatism, the ethno-pluralism and the multiculturalism Kymlicka 
style. 
 
 2.2. The Democratic Functions of Liberal Culturalism 
 Of course, there could be some mitigating circumstances that would justify the affin-
ity between Kymlicka’s multiculturalism and the right-wing ideologies. After all, Kym-
licka claims to have adopted his culturalist stance not (only) because of the intrinsic 
value of national minority cultures, but also because the state protection of minority na-
tions would be instrumental for a functioning liberal democracy. Kymlicka claims that 
there are essentially three functions that the collective rights for national minorities 
would fulfill. Such a policy would 
(1) enable deliberation through a common language, 
(2) advance individual freedom by enabling the development of autonomous individuals, 
(3) promote social justice through fostering solidarity (Kymlicka 2001: 225-229). 
 We do not need to concern ourselves in detail with the first function here, as it is 
clearly at odds with much of Kymlicka’s own writings. For one, it applies only to lin-
guistic minorities and would thereby have little to offer to Serbs in Croatia, Catholics in 
Northern Ireland, or the Amish in the US, all of whom are clearly captured by Kym-
licka’s own minority concept. More importantly, for those national minorities that are 
linguistically defined, the lingua franca argument would not lend itself to the multicul-
turalist policies Kymlicka style, but to the state nationalism of the XVIII century 
France. Kymlicka’s multiculturalist policy prescription can therefore not serve the 
function of strengthening deliberative politics through a common language. 
 
 2.2.1. National Minorities and Culture 
 Let us now examine the second function of liberal culturalism. Does the importance 
of culture for individual development redeem for culturalism’s affinity to romantic na-
tionalism? It is, of course, true that the development of an individual self presupposes a 
cultural repertoire, into which the individual can tap. But to view nations as the only or 
even the most important source of this repertoire not only underestimates the cultural 
resources of non-national groups – such as the working class, the hip-hop movement, or 
lawyers for that matter – but overestimates the coherence of “national cultures.” It also 
posits a false necessity of state support for the development of culture, ignores the role 
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of state and state-like institutions in the emergence of “national” culture and, finally, sti-
fles possible venues for protest. 
 By conflating national culture and culture at large, Kymlicka disregards the fact that 
there is undoubtedly a myriad of proto-national cultures that share with the actually ex-
isting nations their cultural distinctiveness, but that nevertheless are not and will not be-
come nations (Gellner, 1983: 44f). What distinguishes them from nations and national 
minorities is their lack of any institutional arrangements that validate that culture as a 
claimholder within states and international organizations. Why would we deny these 
proto-national cultures the protection and support that national minorities should enjoy? 
In other words, is there a rationale why we put a premium on the establishment of na-
tional institutions, a development that facilitates ethnic conflict (Oberschall & Kim 
1996)? Indeed, why would we privilege national minorities over all other cultural 
minorities? That leads us to the question about Kymlicka’s minority concept. 
 Kymlicka does acknowledge that groups based on gender or sexual orientation also 
share a common culture, but that does not entitle these groups to the same protection 
ethnicities should benefit from. 
 According to Kymlicka, even not all ethnic minorities are entitled to the same sort of 
protection. At the top of the hierarchy are the long-established national minorities, who 
live on a compact territory. The examples include Flemings in Belgium, Croats in Bos-
nia, or autochthonous communities like Native Americans in Canada. Next come those 
long-established communities that do not live on a compact territory, such as gypsies or 
Berbers. Further down the ladder are refugees, who fairly recently were displaced from 
their home countries and who live dispersed throughout their host countries. Finally, 
immigrants who “voluntary” migrated have the least claims for minority rights. Apart 
from the fact that this hierarchy replicates the existing pecking order of ethnic minori-
ties in most countries, there seems to be no rationale for its adoption.6 
 Even if one were to justify or eliminate Kymlicka’s typology of ethnic minorities, 
many cultural minorities would find little in Kymlicka’s writings that would validate 
their claims to minority rights. Gays, fundamentalist Christians, hip-hoppers, or feminist 
separatists would search in vain for any recognition that theirs are cultures important for 
the development of an individual. So I guess, it is just bad luck for feminists with the 
Amish background, or South Tyrolean gays. Supposedly, the patriarchal and homopho-
bic “cultures” in which they grew were the key in their individual development, but the 
“subcultures” – a term that itself is deeply nationalist – they later joined had little to 
contribute to their development. Thus, the Amish and the South Tyrolese would qualify 
for minority rights, while feminists or homosexuals would not. Kymlicka practices a 
kind of moral positivism that should comfort conservative politicians but make philoso-
phers shiver. 
 Culture, Kymlicka seems to have forgotten, can and does develop without the state 
support. Indeed, from the early worker’s movement to the contemporary “queer” nation, 
cultural resources have been successfully elicited to win concessions from the state. It is 
 
6 Parekh (2000: 103), for instance, quite rightly asks why, if national cultures are essential for the 
development of autonomous individuals, should migrants be allowed to waive their right for national cultures. 
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only the so-called national culture that can hardly survive without the state support, be-
cause the state is built into the concept of nationality. 
 The privileging of national culture over other cultures furthermore stifles the capac-
ity for oppositional cultures that cannot define themselves as ethnicities, since the dis-
pensation of state support is naturally a strong material resource. For anybody but ro-
mantic nationalists that is bad news. 
 
 2.2.2. Does Democracy Require Collective Identity? 
 Kymlicka brings up yet another justification for the privileging of national cultures 
over other cultures, that is their relation to the welfare state. As T.H. Marshall (1949) 
has taught us, effective democratic citizenship presupposes the implementation of social 
rights. Therefore, any democratic state is to some extent also a welfare state, in which 
citizens are required to “sacrifice” – in Kymlicka’s terminology – part of their income 
for a common good. Therefore, goes his argument, the welfare state presupposes soli-
darity among its citizens. But that is just another of Kymlicka’s myths. It is true that the 
welfare state is a public good and therefore requires the elimination of the free rider 
problem (Olson, 1965). Solidarity is certainly one way to overcome this dilemma, but 
solidarity is only required if the free rider problem has not already been solved through 
the establishment of an organization that can dispense selective incentives (Olson, 1965: 
51, see also his by-product theory), a finding that to date has not been refuted 
(Kim/Bearman, 1997: 72). Has there ever been a more powerful organization than the 
modern state? Probably there has not. Therefore, just as I need not share any solidarity 
with other insurance members when I enter a life insurance scheme of a renowned in-
surance agency, there is no reason to recur to solidarity to implement the welfare state in 
consolidated states. Only the weak states like Moldova or Bosnia require “thick identi-
ties” to overcome a free rider problem. But these are not the states Kymlicka has in his 
mind when he develops his theory around the Canadian case and indeed, the efforts of 
the two mentioned states to thicken – read ethnicize – their identities would more likely 
lead to ethnic conflicts rather than to the welfare state.7 In essence,  
“there is every reason for making deliberate attempts to draw up geographically based 
administrative units that cut across communal boundaries. Gitlin, it may be recalled, 
emphasized the importance of everyone’s having ‘a stake in the commons’, and the 
most basic way of providing people with one is to ensure that there actually is a ‘com-
mons’ in the form of shared institutions upon which all depend alike” (Barry, 2001: 89). 
 Liberal culturalism, thus, also fails in its third goal. Kymlicka hence stands on shaky 
theoretical grounds. Can he consolidate his position with the empirical data? 
 
7 In fact, in my view, not even the much weaker collective identity that is elicited in Habermassian 
constitutional patriotism fosters democracy. Sure, the adherence to a common set of rules that governs 
democratic deliberations and decision-making processes is good. But most existing states are very much 
equipped to enforce such rules without the recourse to collective identity. Any collective identity that overlaps 
with the existing states and statelets merely clutters the existing interest conflicts and serves to exclude non-
nationals. 
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 2.3. Nationalism and Liberal Democracy: Revisiting the Evidence 
 Much of Kymlicka’s theory is dubious from a theoretical standpoint, but does not 
the benign success of Canadian multiculturalism speak for itself? Here we come to the 
question of the empirical grounding of Kymlicka’s theory. Despite all the goodies na-
tionalism supposedly supplies for democracy, there are still some universalist fossils 
who think that nationalism is harmful for liberal democracy. In Kymlicka’s eyes, these 
are well-meaning intellectuals who are out of touch with the every-day reality of “ordi-
nary citizens”. But is it not Kymlicka himself who is out of touch with reality? 
 Kymlicka thinks that 
“the assumption that minority cultural nationalisms are a defensive and xenophobic re-
action to modernity is often overstated. This maybe true of the current situation in 
Rwanda or Bosnia, but I think there are many cases of minority nationalisms around the 
world today which […] are forward looking political movements for the creation of free 
and equal citizens. They seek to create a democratic society, defined and united by a 
common language and sense of history. I think that’s what most Québécois nationalists 
seek, as well as most Catalan, Scottish, and Flemish nationalists” (Kymlicka, 2001: 
246). 
 I call that a bluff. Consider the Vlaams Blok, the main Flemish nationalist party. It is 
forward looking in the sense that it legitimizes its demand for Brussels as the future 
capital of an independent Flanders by pointing to the fact that “before the year 1500 
only 5% of all official documents of the city of Brussels were written in French” 
(Vlaams Blok, 2000a). The Vlaams Blok expresses its “xenophilia” by demanding 
- a free debate about the foreigner problem 
- an immigration stoppage through a repeal of the family reunion policy, tighter controls 
of the authenticity of binational marriages, a limitation of political asylum to Europeans, 
and the mandatory return of non-European university students upon graduation 
- the actual expulsion of criminal and illegal foreigners 
- an “own Volk first” policy, which provides unemployment and social benefits mainly 
to nationals (Vlaams Blok, 2000a; 2000b: 1f). 
 Of course, the Vlaams Blok is one of the more zealous organizations of Flemish 
nationalism, but with a share of about one sixth of the Flemish vote8 it is far from being 
on its fringes. Flemish nationalism is not chiefly concerned with liberal democracy but 
primarily pushes the agenda of ethnic homogenization. 
 Conversely, Kymlicka’s guess that Bosnian nationalism is a xenophobic reaction of 
backward-looking folks is also not in tune with empirical reality. Researching national-
ist mobilizations in the Krajina region, Bougarel (1999) shows that the appeal of nation-
 
8 In 1999, the Vlaams Blok captured 15.5% of the vote in the regional elections in Flanders 
(http://www.vub.ac.be/POLI/elections/5000.html, April 27, 2001).  
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alism was not necessarily higher in the “backward looking” rural areas than in the urban 
centers. And the “tribal organization [of the warring factions] and their culture of vio-
lence, cannot be understood without taking into account their relations with the state 
(Bougarel, 1999), a decidedly modern actor. A different study finds that the Yugoslav 
elites utilized nationalist populism to mobilize rather apathetic people, who before the 
outbreak of the war were not particularly interested in their ethnicity (Oberschall, 2000). 
A third study documents that nationalism was a rather low-key priority among the Serb 
minorities in Bosnia and Croatia, and was indeed only reluctantly imported through the 
elites based in Belgrade (Gagnon, 2001). Possibly, the claim that “Yugoslavia’s death 
and the violence that followed resulted from the conscious actions of nationalist leaders 
who co-opted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their dema-
gogic designs” (Harvey, 2000) is a too sweeping statement. But even a scholar who de-
rides the “tendency among social scientists and others to interpret the ethnic cleansing 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina as the result of a political policy carefully orchestrated from 
above and systematically carried out” (Bax, 2000: 28) acknowledges that “it is difficult 
to maintain that the [war] was the outcome of primitive balkanism, age/old tribalism” 
(ibid., 28f). Kymlicka has apparently fallen prey to the orientalism that prevails in many 
analyses of the Balkans (Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Todorova 1994).9 
 Of course, Kymlicka is a political philosopher and not an anthropologist or sociolo-
gist with a sweet tooth for empirical research. But shouldn’t we still expect a little more 
care when he attempts to illustrate his theses with empirical examples? It seems that he 
is far more entrenched in the academic ivory tower than the cosmopolitan liberals he ac-
cuses of debasement. 
 
 3. A Manual for Conservative Politicians 
 In the end, neither Kymlicka’s empirical, nor his theoretical case seems compelling. 
There is very little in his concept of national minority that does not seem to be inspired 
more by the existing political arrangements than philosophical thought. But Kymlicka’s 
empiricism is unfortunately limited to the construction of his conceptual framework. 
Where empiricism would be in order, namely in the justification of his empirical hy-
potheses, Kymlicka resorts to mere prejudice or hearsay. 
 Why are Kymlicka’s theses nevertheless that popular? I already mentioned several 
times Kymlicka’s tendency to moral positivism. Despite its unpopularity among phi-
losophers, Kymlicka seems to have no qualms about validating contemporary practices. 
He writes: 
 “[I]nsofar as [multicultural policy] patterns have been worked out by legislators and ju-
rists within liberal democracies, and have become widely accepted by influential com-
 
9 Although the conflict in Rwanda is unsurprisingly under-researched, the prospects that backward-
looking peasants rather than modern political elites have engineered the Rwandan genocide are dim, too 
(Harvey, 2000), as the meager evidence points to a “very well planned, organized, deliberate and conducted 
campaign of terror initiated principally by [Rwanda’s] Presidential Guard” (Booh Booh in Carlsson/Sung-
Joo/Kupolati, 1999: 40). 
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mentators and everyday citizens, then they provide useful clues about what a liberal 
theory of minority rights should look like.” 
 Such an approach to political philosophy is, of course, extremely susceptible to 
hegemony. Indeed, one may argue that Kymlicka does his part to enforce the current 
hegemonic approach to multiculturalism which, as has been shown elsewhere (Hage, 
1998: chapter 4), has not departed far from the supremacist ideology of less popular na-
tionalists. As such Kymlicka is an effective reading for the current leaders from Tony 
Blair to George W. Bush, who proclaim themselves multiculturalists but have no 
qualms about attributing the suffocation of a group of migrants workers to “organized 
criminals” (not entrenched in the state) and the imprisonment of almost half the popula-
tion of young African American males to “individual failure” rather than to the nation-
alist immigration regimes and ineffective welfare regimes, respectively. For the political 
philosopher, Kymlicka has little to offer, though. 
 In the end, let me encourage you to read Kymlicka’s book. True, Brian Barry (2001) 
has recently published a concise and eloquent critique of Kymlicka that should dispense 
of the myth that Kymlicka has produced a state-of-the-art liberal theory of democracy. 
But only by reading Kymlicka one may be sure that the weakness of his theory is not 
going to be attributed to Barry’s eloquence, but to the serious flaws of the theory itself. 
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